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Using the Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the United States as a 
laboratory, this paper examines the impacts of government bank bailouts on the 
real economy. The paper first finds that the aided banks' clients, on average, 
suffer an economically significant valuation loss of 2.5% in the 3-day cumulative 
abnormal return around the announcements of their main banks’ approval to 
TARP. Such valuation loss is aggravated with banks’ poor ex-ante financial 
conditions. Further evidences show that aided banks reduce supply of credit in 
post-TARP period, making their clients become more financially constrained and 
reduce their capital investment subsequently. Overall, findings in the paper 
provide systematic evidences suggesting that TARP failed to ease the credit 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
“Congress approved the $700 billion rescue plan with the idea that banks would help 
struggling borrowers and increase lending to stimulate the economy, and many 
lawmakers want to know how the first half of that money has been spent before approving 
the second half. But many banks that have received bailout money so far are reluctant to 
lend, worrying that if new loans go bad, they will be in worse shape if the economy 
deteriorates.” 
<Bailout Is a Windfall to Banks, if Not to Borrowers>  
 New York Times 
Jan 17th, 2009 
 
“In short, although the TARP provided critical government support to the financial 
system when the financial system was in a severe crisis, its effectiveness at pursuing its 
broader statutory goals has been far more limited.” 
<Assessing the TARP on the Eve of Its Expiration> 
Federal Reserve Bank Report 
Sept. 16th, 2010 
 
 
In the global financial crisis of 2008, many governments around the world have 
aggressively stepped in to rescue the economy with various types of stimulus packages in 
response to the massive failure in the financial system and severe credit crunch in the 
economy. Among these rescue programs, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), as 
the largest government bailout program in the US history, has attracted the most attention 
globally. Although a large body of literature1 in economics and finance suggests that 
active government interventions in credit market are beneficial to the economy during 
crisis, the effectiveness of such interventions in achieving their initial goals relies largely 
on the design of the rescue program(E.g. Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010; Diamond and Rajan, 
2011; Giannetti and Simonov, 2012). In the case of TARP, debates over it have been 
widely carried out in the central government as well as in the general public since its 
inception. As a matter of fact, against the objective at initiation that is to enhance market 
                                                 
1 E.g. Gerschenkron (1962) and Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) 
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liquidity, many of these TARP recipient banks (henceforth, TARP bank) withheld the 
bailout capital instead of lending out to the U.S. corporations and households. Acharya et 
al (2009) show that the cash holding of the U.S. commercial banks surged after 
government equity injection, while Duchin and Sosyura (2014) find evidences suggesting 
that TARP induced risk-taking activities of the banks. Nevertheless, most of the existing 
studies draw their conclusion on TARP with bank-level evidences, and yet very few goes 
beyond the banking sector to explore the impact of TARP on real sectors. In fact, 
empirical evidence on assessing the real effects of government rescue programs with 
respect to different designs remains scarce. 
My paper aims to fill the void in the literature as among the first papers to examine the 
real effect of TARP. In particular, using firm-level data, the paper focuses on exploiting 
micro-evidences on the real effects of equity infusion by the U.S. Treasury to domestic 
financial institutions under Capital Purchase Program (CPP)2 in the recent financial crisis.   
Existing theoretical studies point out that the success of such government equity 
infusion depends on the size of capital injection. Only large enough capital injection 
could resolve banks’ debt overhang problem and effectively make banks to resume 
lending. Insufficient injections, as suggested by Diamond and Rajan (2000), could even 
alter banks’ lending policies, resulting in evergreen lending to bad firms and decreases in 
credit availability to creditworthy borrowers. Giannetti and Simonov (2012) use Japanese 
government recapitalization in the late 90s to test this and find consistent evidence. In the 
context of U.S. bank bailouts, an article from Forbes called “TARP after three years: it 
made things worse, not better” points out that: 
                                                 
2 In CPP, the U.S. Treasury injected equity by purchasing preferred shares of the participating financial 
institutions. There are 13 subprograms within TARP and CPP is the largest subprogram.  
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“The problem with most U.S. banks in 2008 was not that they were “under-
capitalized” but that they held so many shaky (sub-prime) residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS)…The majority of U.S. banks were perfectly healthy in 
2008-2009 and should have been left free of TARP.” 
 
The size of the capital injection appears not to be able to fully explain why TARP 
recipient banks choose to withhold the government funds rather than to lend out. 
Diamond and Rajan (2009) further investigate into the phenomena and highlight that 
bank's reluctance to lend could due to: (i) worry about borrower's credit risk (ii) credit 
demand of their own (iii) fear of short of funding if good investment opportunities come 
along. Along the same line, Acharya et al (2009) build theoretical model to argue that 
choices of banks in holding liquidity is counter-cyclical. While unconditional liquidity 
support to banks give them incentives to hold less liquidity, conditional support based on 
banks’ liquid asset holdings creates incentives for banks to hold more cash so as to be 
classified as “desirable banks” by the government. On the other hand, empirical studies 
find that shocks to banking sector, especially commercial banks, adversely affect their 
clients’ performance as well as operation and investment activities (E.g. Kang and Stulz, 
2000, Gibson, 1995, and Dell ‘Ariccia et al, 2008). Fernando et al (2010) also show 
adverse effect for investment banks on their clients by studying the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers.   
Built on these theoretical and empirical foundations, I examine the real effects of 
TARP on participant banks’ clients. I start with studying the price reaction of banks’ 
clients when the banks receive approval to TARP. At the bank level, Bayazitova and 
Shivdasani (2012) show that there is no adverse signalling associated with TARP 
participation. However, to the extent that banks' recourse to TARP can serve as a “wake-
10 
 
up call” and lead market participants to confirm the weakness of the banks, investors can 
also react adversely on their clients as they anticipate these TARP firms to face 
difficulties in raising funds from aided banks for future investments or operations. In 
contrast, banks receiving TARP fund could effectively internalize the cost of adverse 
signalling with the benefits arising from the government bailout. To be more specific, 
TARP banks could use the bailout fund to strengthen their capital adequacy, preventing 
them from further deterioration or could use the TARP capital to capture growth 
opportunities, offsetting the detrimental effect arising from adverse signalling. Hence, 
there is no significant effect observed at the bank level (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 
2012). Figure 2 offers a graphical illustration of the hypothesis.   
To test this hypothesis, I employ LPC Dealscan database to identify relationship firms 
of TARP participated banks (henceforth, TARP firms), supplemented with financial and 
stock information from CRSP and Compustat. Sample spans the period from 2006 to 
2011 for all public companies in US with lending activities reported in Dealscan after 
2003. In particular, to identify TARP firm, I classify a firm as a TARP firm if it has any 
TARP bank as its main bank – number one relationship bank based on its past 5-year 
lending relationship prior to October 2008(see Figure 1). For the baseline results on 
announcement, I also specify the treatment and control sample according to each 
announcement event. 
The results first show that clients of TARP banks suffer an economically significant 
average valuation loss of 2.5% in the 3-day abnormal return relative to control firms 
when their banks get approved to the program. This is consistent with the conjecture that 
banks’ approvals to TARP have confirmation effects on banks’ poor financial condition, 
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resulting in an adverse impact on the clients. The findings appear to support the 
transmission of adverse signalling from banks to clients and complement with those of 
Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012). Moreover, I further incorporate TARP banks’ ex-ante 
financial characteristics into the analyses and find such valuation loss of TARP firm is 
negatively associated with their banks’ ex-ante financial condition, measured by a series 
of bank performance indicators. This reinforces the evidences to support the argument.   
Furthermore, I examine the impact of government injection on TARP banks’ credit 
supply. Consistent with anecdotal evidences that banks withhold the bailout capital 
instead of lending out, I find a significant reduction in supply of credit from TARP banks 
in the post-TARP period. The magnitude of reduction is significantly and adversely 
correlated with bank’s ex-ante financial condition. In addition, I examine the impact of 
TARP on its reliance on bank credit. The results show that the proportion of bank loans 
in the total debt of TARP firms significantly drops after TARP injection. This direct 
evidence reinforces the previous findings on announcement effects, suggesting that 
scarce of future financing from TARP banks leads to valuation reduction of TARP firms.  
Finally, I examine the degree of financial constraints and capital investment of TARP 
firms in the post-TARP periods. First, I examine the cash flow sensitivity of cash and 
find that the cash holding of TARP firms become more sensitive to cash flow after their 
main banks' participation in TARP, whereas no effect is found in non-TARP firms. Next, 
I examine the investment activities of TARP firms. Consistent with previous results on 
cash flow sensitivity, I find that TARP firms significantly reduce investments after their 
main banks' participations in TARP. Further evidence shows that firms with small size, 
highly leveraged, low Z-score, high White and Wu (2006) (WW) ratio response more to 
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TARP by reducing their investments, suggesting that such reduction in investment is due 
to financial constraint instead of precautionary savings at the firm level.  
To the best of my knowledge, the paper is among the first to examine the effect of 
TARP beyond the financial system. In related work on TARP, Bayazitova and Shivdasani 
(2012) find that strong banks rather than weak ones opted out of participating in TARP as 
the capital injection is relatively costly to these banks. Veronesi and Zingales (2008) 
highlight the net benefit arising from a reduction in probability of bankruptcy associated 
with first round TARP injection to nine banks on October 14, 2008. Norden et al (2013) 
also examine the impact of TARP on corporate borrowers’ stock returns and they find 
positive announcement effects instead. The key differences in the empirical analyses 
which could drive the variation in results between theirs and mine is that they use 6 
infusion dates instead of announcement dates to compute the cumulative abnormal 
returns to assess the announcement effect of TARP. Strictly speaking, to infer the policy 
effects, announcement date price reaction is the appropriate measure and the positive 
price reaction around infusion dates could be driven by other concurrent events, e.g. 
many countries proposed and implemented similar stimulus programs around the same 
period.  
Moreover, Duchin and Sosyura (2014) suggest that banks take on more risk after 
government bailout. In another paper by the same authors (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012), 
they point out that banks’ political ties play a significant role in TARP fund distribution. 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) argue that the liquidity drain due to runs by short-term 
creditors and borrowers who drew down credit lines leads to banks to cut their lending.  
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In addition, my paper adds to the literature by evaluating the real effects of 
government financial interventions during crisis. Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Hoshi 
and Kashyap (2010) argue that too small recapitalizations may encourage perverse 
lending policies and even decrease the supply of credit for borrowers with valuable 
investment opportunities. Particularly, my paper belongs to a handful of studies 
investigate the systemic impact of government interventions in real economy. For 
example, Giannetti and Simonov (2012) investigate the real effect of capital injection in 
Japan and find that capital injection increases the value of bank clients, especially for 
those zombie clients when banks are facing soft budget constraint. In contrast, I find that 
capital injection in US is bad news for bank-dependent firms. Noted that findings in 
Giannetti and Simonov (2012) and ours are not mutually exclusive, and the difference in 
findings in fact highlights the importance of institutional background in assessing the 
government intervention, as given same set of intervention tools are adopted, various 
outcomes could be obtained in different regulation and economic environments. 
Lastly, the paper contributes to the growing body of literatures investigating the 
adverse signalling of government interventions in financial market (Peristiani, 1998; 
Furfine, 2003; Ennis and Weinberg, 2009, Armantier et.al, 2012). My paper suggests that 
even the adverse signalling associated with participation in government rescue program 
may not be directly observed at bank level, it could transfer from bank to its client firms, 
resulting in significant valuation losses of client firms. The study in this paper improves 
our understanding on design of such government intervention activities by opening up 
new angles to look into the potential problem.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional 
background on TARP. I review the literature and propose the hypotheses in section 3. 
Section 4 discusses the data and variable definitions. Section 5 presents the baseline 
results on announcement effect, while section 6 discusses the effect of TARP on access to 




Chapter 2 Institutional Background 
 
The recent financial crisis started with the collapse of investment banking giant – 
Lehman Brothers. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy 
protection, unleashing the chaos in the financial markets. Aiming at alleviating the credit 
crunch due to the collapse of subprime mortgage market, TARP was developed from the 
initial proposal of then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and was signed by President 
Bush into law the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008 on October 3, 
2008. The $700 billion TARP consists of 13 programs with the objective to calm the 
massive panic and to restore investors’ confidence. Among the programs, Treasury 
announced a voluntary Capital Purchase Program (CPP) to inject capital to viable 
financial institutions of all sizes throughout the nation. Advocates of the program argue 
that without a viable banking system, lending to businesses and consumers could have 
frozen and the financial crisis might have spiralled further out of control. 
My paper focuses on CPP rather than all the programs in TARP. As of December 
2009, Treasury invested $204.9 billion in 707 financial institutions across 48 states via 
CPP, making CPP the first and the largest subprogram within TARP. The first round of 
CPP equity injection went to nine financial institutions on October 14, 2008, which 
announced to subscribe to the facility in an aggregate amount of $125 billion. These nine 
institutions include, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, 
Citigroup, JP Morgan, Bank of New York Mellon, State Street, and Wells Fargo. From 
October 15 through November 14 in the same year, an additional 53 banks received $50.3 
billion in CPP capital, and from November 15 through April 24, 2009, a further 419 
banks received equity infusions totalling $14 billion. To account for the possibility that 
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the attributes of CPP recipients changed over time, I consider the initial 9 institutions to 
be in “round 1”, those who received CPP before the November 14 deadline to be in 
“round 2” and later recipients to be in “round 3”. 
Under CPP, the Treasury invests in financial institutions through non-voting preferred 
shares, and the size of investment is restricted to be between 1% and 3% of the firm’s 
risk-weighted asset 3 . In order to apply for TARP funding under CPP, a financial 
institution needs to be a domestic bank, bank holding company, saving association, and 
savings and loan holding company (SNL) and submit application to its primary regulator, 
such as Federal Reserve and FDIC by November 14, 2008. Subject to first round review 
via Camels rating system, successful application is later forwarded to the Treasury for 
final approval. Approved banks receive TARP funding as preferred stock, which is 
designed not to dilute the outstanding common shares. Recipient banks are required to 
pay 5% dividend on a quarterly basis for the first 5 years and 9% thereafter. In addition, 
the Treasury also receives warrants valid for 10 years to purchase common stock for an 
amount of 15% of the preferred share investment.   
On the other hand, participants need to comply with the restrictions attached to the 
program, e.g. limitation on executive compensation, which is found to be a huge burden 
to banks in the program. In fact, because of these restrictions imposed by the program, 
many participant banks started to consider repaying the government fund after a few 
months from TARP fund injection. On March 31, 2009, four banks announced their 
repayment of all preferred shares issued to the U.S. Treasury. On 9 June 2009, ten of the 
TARP banks announced that they set to leave the $700 billion program. The banks, 
including Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, American Express, and Morgan Stanley, 
                                                 
3 The maximum threshold is set at 3% of risk-weighted asset or $25billion. 
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were granted permission to repay a total of $68 billion and free themselves on the 
restrictions in place under the TARP act. Many other banks submitted applications to 





Chapter 3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
Government recapitalization benefits the financial sector by helping banks restore 
their financial strength. Moreover, government equity injection such as TARP, may work 
as an insurance or government implicit guarantee, largely reducing bankruptcy risk of 
banks. In contrast, there are “dark sides” associated with government bailout. Many 
studies point out that adverse signalling would significantly deter banks’ incentive to 
participate in government rescue program as firms’ access to government supportive 
programs can send negative signals about their financial health to the market (e.g. Ennis 
and Weinberg, 2009; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010).  
Given the concern on adverse signalling, most of the government rescue programs are 
designed with efforts to mitigate this problem. In the case of Japanese banking 
recapitalization in the late 90s, banks received equal amount of government capital 
injection in order to avoid any adverse signalling on participants. Along the same line, the 
equity injection of CPP in TARP is designed with a similar structure, as it aims at 
supporting systematically important institutions in order to reduce the systematic risk of 
the economy rather than targeting weak institutions. Empirical evidences shown by 
Veronesi and Zingales (2008), and Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) find a positive and 
significant abnormal return for TARP banks around TARP initiation. Particularly, 
Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) highlight that there is no valuation loss at its approval 
announcement, suggesting that adverse signalling is not a major concern at bank level. 
Noted that government bailout also suggests an assurance which offsets the adverse effect 
arising from signalling weakness in financial conditions, the insignificant announcement 
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effect is consistent with this notion of internalizing the cost and benefit arising from the 
government capital injection. 
Nevertheless, at the banks’ client level, participations of their relationship banks in 
government rescue program could lead to significant valuation loss by conveying 
additional negative information or confirming the poor financial condition of the banks. 
Carvalho et al (2012) and Chava and Purnandam (2011) argue that borrowers suffer from 
poor financial health of their banks. Therefore, if participation in government rescue 
program conveys negative information about banks’ financial health or confirm banks’ 
poor financial condition, market may also response adversely to their relationship firms, 
as investors anticipate these firms to experience shortage in bank credit in the near future. 
On the other hand, one could argue that government capital injection would benefit bank 
dependent borrowers through reducing uncertainties and precautionary savings of banks, 
even though the government guarantee effects may not be easily transmitted to bank 
clients(Gamba and Triantis 2008; Riddick and Whited, 2009). If that is the case, one 
would expect that capital injection in banks is associated with positive price reactions for 
bank dependent firms.  
However, both anecdotal evidence and several studies show that TARP banks actually 
withheld the injected capital instead of lending them out to the economy. For example, 
Diamond and Rajan (2011) point out that capital injection into weak institutions with 
illiquid asset would increase risk of fire sales, and aggravating credit rationing problem. 
Acharya et al (2009) argue that banks choose to hold more liquidity for acquisition 
motives. In addition, the increasing likelihood of future government regulation can also 
induce banks to withhold the capital. Therefore, one would expect even with government 
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capital, TARP banks can reduce instead of increase credit supply to their client firms. 
Such contraction in credit supply from TARP banks could also lead to financial 
constraint of their clients.  
Based on aforementioned arguments, we develop a series of testable hypotheses as the 
followings. 
Announcement effect (H1):  
- TARP firms experience larger valuation reduction comparing to non-TARP firms 
upon the announcement of their main banks’ approval to TARP.  
- Such valuation reduction is negatively associated with banks’ ex-ante financial 
condition and positively relates to increases in cash holding or tier 1 capital ratio 
after TARP injection.  
Access to credit (H2):  
- There is a larger reduction in credit supply from TARP banks comparing with 
non-TARP banks after TARP injection. 
- Such reduction is exacerbated with banks’ poorer ex-ante financial condition and 
increases in cash holding or tier 1 capital ratio after TARP injection.  
Financial constraint (H3):  
- TARP firms become more financially constrained and thereby reduce investments 





Chapter 4 Data and Variables 
 
Sample contains 1,503 bank dependent public firms which meet the following three 
requirements: (1) have borrowing activities reported in LPC Dealscan after 2003 and 
before Oct. 2008; (2) have financial and stock information from Compustat and CRSP 
and specially with non-missing total asset and market-to-book ratio values in fiscal year 
2007; (3) are non-financial and non-utility firms, which exclude firms with one-digit SIC 
equals to 6 and firms with two-digit SIC equals 49.  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of sample firms in the paper. Financial 
information of sample firms is obtained from the annual financial filing from Compustat 
in fiscal year 2007. I also compute Altman’s Z-score and WW value based on Whited and 
Wu (2006). In the paper, bank financial information characteristics are obtained from 
Bankscope database. I manually merge TARP banks information with Dealscan and 
Bankscope. 
To capture firms’ exposure to government capital injection, I adopt measures of 
lending relationship between a bank and a firm. First, I use a dummy variable which 
equals to one if a firm’s main bank participates in TARP, and zero otherwise. TARP 
firms refer to firms which have any of their main bank4 received the TARP fund, whereas 
non-TARP firms refer to those which have none of their main bank received the 
government fund. Second, I construct a measure of firm’s exposure to government capital 
injection to a certain bank based on the total amount of loans from TARP bank as of all 
loans of the firm within the last 5 years. Finally, I use the number of loans from TARP 
bank as of the total number of loans of firm i within last 5 years prior to 2008.  
                                                 
4 Main bank is defined as the bank which a firm has the most lending activities from in the past 5 years.   
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Chapter 5 Empirical Results 
 
In this chapter, I report and discuss the empirical results.  
5.1 Announcement Effect of TARP Approval 
 
To study the announcement effect of TARP firm, I adopt the event study methodology. 
First, I identify the announcement date of a bank being approved to TARP program5. For 
banks with multiple TARP injections, I only consider the first (earliest) announcement in 
the analyses. As a result, out of the 559 banks participated in TARP, I successfully 
identify the approval announcement dates of 393 banks (approx. 70%). Next, I require 
TARP banks to have lending activities reported on Dealscan database, and this gives us a 
final sample of 100 TARP approval announcement events. Finally, I identify the 
treatment firms – ones with exposure to a particular TARP approval announcement, 
whereas control firms are the ones have no exposure to a certain approval announcement 
but do have borrowing activities from Dealscan over the studied period. 
In specific, the exposure to TARP approval announcement is measured based on 
previous 5 year’s lending relationship between a certain TARP participated bank and a 
firm prior to Oct. 2008. For example, firm A’s main bank is Citibank, while firm B’s 
main bank is another bank – bank T, which could be a TARP bank or a non-TARP bank. 
On Oct. 14, 2008, Citibank’s acceptance of TARP fund is announced. In this case, firm A 
is considered as treatment sample. For firm B, it is considered as control sample as long 
as bank T doesn’t receive TARP approval on the same date. In addition, TARP approvals 
                                                 
5 I thank Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) to share the data on announcement date of TARP approval for 
participating banks, and I manually check and supplement data with Factiva.    
23 
 
are likely to cluster in time. For multiple announcements on the same date, I consider 
them as a single event in the baseline regressions and pool the treatment and control 
sample to delete duplicated observations.  
In addition, I require all firms in the sample to be publicly listed with financial and 
stock information available in Compustat and CRSP. Financial and utility firms are 
excluded in the sample. A 260-day estimation window is implemented, i.e.  [Day -290, 
Day -31] and firms are required to have non-missing returns on all days from day -5 to 
day +5 around the announcement date. 
Table 2 first provides univariate results of cumulative abnormal return. Treatment 
group includes firms which have any of their main bank receive approval to TARP 
program on a certain date, whereas control firms include other sample firms which do not 
have any of their main bank receive approval to the program on the date. TARP is 
initiated with the goal to inject liquidity to the economy and to alleviate credit crunch. 
Hence, one should expect a positive announcement effect on stock return of firms in the 
economy, especially to those firms with lending relationship with TARP banks. However, 
my results show consistent negative and significant CARs for treatment sample over 
different event window and across different model specifications.   
In panel A, with adjusted market model, I find that treatment firms experience an 
average negative CAR of -3.38% over a three-day window around announcement. 
Although control firms also experience a significant and negative CAR of -0.86% in the 
same period, the magnitude in CAR is significantly smaller than treatment firms. As 
event window increases, the sign of CARs become positive for control firms. However, 
consistent results are found in treatment firms in the seven-day and eleven-day windows 
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around announcement. In panel B and C, I calculate CAR over different event windows 
with Fama-French three-factor model and Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model 
respectively. Consistent patterns in the abnormal returns are found under all three model 
specifications, i.e. treatment firms have significant and negative CARs for all the 
examined event windows and the magnitudes are significantly larger than control firms.  
Furthermore, Table 3 shows the results of multivariate analyses. OLS regressions are 
run on abnormal returns around TARP approval announcements followed equation (1)  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (1) 
 
Dependent variable is CAR (-1 day, +1 day) of firm i around approval event at time t. 
The main independent variable is 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 , where i refers to 
firm i and t refers to event at time t. 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡  is constructed 
based on the past 5-year lending relationship prior to October 2008 between firm i and 
banks which receives the approval of TARP at time t. Particularly, only borrowing 
relationship with main bank is included when calculate E𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙. 
Three measures of exposure are adopted in the paper. The first measure is a dummy 
variable which equals to one if event bank is the main bank of the firm based on the past 
5-year lending amount prior to October 2008, and zero otherwise. Two alternative 
measures which substitute the dummy with the actual amount and number of loans from 
the event bank to the sample firm scaled by total loans outstanding of the firm. For firms 
with exposure to multiple TARP banks on the same event date, I accumulate the exposure 
measure.  
In column 1 and 2 of Table 3, I find consistently negative and significant coefficients 
of 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 dummy, indicating a -2.5% reduction in CAR(-1, +1) 
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suffered by the treatment firms. Next, in column 3 and 4, I use the two alternative 
measures of TARP exposure and find similar effects with slightly larger magnitudes. The 
negative announcement CARs support the earlier hypothesis, highlighting the valuation 
losses associated with TARP participation, even though such effect is not clearly 
identified at bank level.  
Furthermore, I examine whether there is any variation in announcement effects across 
different rounds of injection. The sample is divided into three sub-groups according to the 
announcement date. Round 1 includes all the observations of approval announcements on 
October 14, 2008. This includes 8 banks, namely Bank of America, Citigroup, BNY, 
Wells Fargo, State Street, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs. Approval 
announcements taking places between October 21, 2008 and November 14, 2008 belong 
to round 2, while announcement dates between November 15, 2008 and September 24, 
2009 are classified as round 3. In the OLS regression shown in column 5, interaction 
terms between 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 and round dummies are added in. To the 
extent that the magnitudes of valuation losses in all rounds are with similar level, the 
negative price reaction to main bank’s approval announcement is not driven by a 
particular round of TARP injection but associated with the whole program.  
In panel B of Table 3, similar OLS regressions with a subsample obtained through 
propensity score matching is performed for robustness check. Consistent evidences as the 
full sample estimations are found in the subsample across different model specifications. 
However, point estimates of the key independent variables decrease slightly comparing to 
full sample estimations. When further interact TARP exposure measure with round 
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dummies, statistical significance of the interaction term in round 3 drops, as market 
gradually incorporate the adverse effect into price.  
Noted that as announcement dates cluster in time and same firm could appear in 
multiple events, to mitigate the potential bias in estimation due to correlations in standard 
errors, two-way clustering at announcement date and firm level are adopted in all 
regressions in Table 3.  
Overall, both univariate and multivariate analyses indicate a significant valuation loss 
suffered by firms with exposure to TARP approval announcement. I interpret these 
results as evidence to support hypothesis one (H1). My results don’t go against Veronesi 
and Zingales (2008), and Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) that TARP banks experience 
positive and significant abnormal returns at approval announcement. I argue that TARP 
serves as an insurance or government guarantee which offsets the adverse signalling at 
bank level. Nevertheless, TARP participation still reflects bank’s bad shape, and 
investors anticipate client firms of TARP banks to experience a lending shortfall in the 
near future.  
Next, I examine how banks’ ex-ante financial characteristics affect client firms’ price 
reaction to TARP approval announcements. As I argue that valuation reduction of TARP 
firms is primarily due to the adverse signalling associated with TARP participation, one 
should expect firms associated with poorer TARP banks suffer larger reduction in 
valuation. A series of regressions are run followed equation (2). 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (2) 
Only subsample of treatment observations are examined in Table 4. Bank financial 
characteristics incorporated in the analyses include dummies which equals to one if a 
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bank is in top 50% in size, NPL ratio, cash ratio, tier 1 capital ratio, ROA as of the 
universe of all U.S. banks in Bankscope in year 2007. In addition, effects of changes in 
cash holding and tier 1 capital ratio after TARP injections on firm price reactions are also 
examined. Firm financial characteristics including size, cash/asset, leverage, market-to-
book, ROA and interest coverage as well as industry fixed effects are controlled in the 
estimations. Standard errors are clustered at bank and announcement date level 
respectively in the regressions.  
Table 4 provides the regression results. In column 1, large bank dummy is associated 
with a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that firms connected to larger 
banks suffer larger valuation reductions. One potential explanation to this is that the 
recent financial crisis is accompanied with freezing of interbank market. Large banks rely 
on interbank market for liquidity, whereas small banks rely more on the demandable 
deposits for liquidity. Great degree of uncertainty in the interbank market induces large 
banks to save more. Alternatively, it could also due to the reason that large banks have 
involved more heavily in issuing and trading subprime mortgage back securities, which 
in turn suffered the most when crisis is onset. Hence, bank size is highly correlated with 
the firms’ exposure to the subprime crisis, thereby the bigger size of the bank, the higher 
reduction in supply of bank credit, resulting in larger valuation losses of the client firms.  
In addition, dummy indicating higher than median non-performing loan (NPL) ratio 
has a negative and significant coefficient of -0.051. As higher NPL ratio reveals low asset 
quality of the banks, the finding supports the hypothesis that poorer ex-ante financial 
conditions are associated with larger adverse effects. In contrast, variables which higher 
values suggest better financial condition of the bank, such as cash/asset ratio, tier 1 
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capital ratio, and ROA, all give positive coefficients in the estimations, reinforcing the 
hypothesis.     
Further, I examine the effects of incremental changes in banks’ cash holding ratio and 
tier 1 capital ratio after TARP injection on client firms’ stock price reactions. This offers 
a more direct check of the channels which lead to the valuation reduction of client firms. 
As in Table 4, increases in both cash holding and tier 1 capital ratios are negatively 
associated with relationship firms’ CAR around approval announcement, suggesting that 
banks’ use of government funds to do precautionary saving or to meet capital 
requirement significantly harms their client firms’ valuation.  
Overall, results in Table 4 support my hypothesis. It shows that the better ex-ante 
financial condition of the aided banks, the less valuation losses experienced by client 
firms. Further, findings on changes in cash holding and tier 1 capital ratio after TARP 
injection provide suggestive evidence that banks’ usage of TARP funding adversely 
affect client firms’ valuation.  
 
 
5.2 Access to Bank Credit 
 
Built on the previous suggestive evidences, I further examine the potential channels 
which could lead to the valuation losses of client firms when their main banks participate 
in TARP. In particular, I study the effect of TARP on firms’ accessibility to bank credit. 
As one of the key objectives of TARP is to inject liquidity to the economy, to examine 
the ex-post impact of TARP on credit accessibility is not only important to supplement 
findings on announcement effects, but also crucial to evaluate the effectiveness of TARP 
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in easing firm’s fund constraint and increasing degree of accessibility of credit to the U.S. 
corporations.  
First, I test the effect of TARP on supply of credit. I argue that TARP firms may not 
be able to access to bank credit as TARP banks maintain the government fund to 
overhaul their balance sheet and improve their capital ratio. As a result, the borrowings of 
these firms from the TARP banks will decline subsequently. In order to test this, I run 
OLS regressions on changes in the total loan amount from a certain bank to a particular 
firm before and after TARP. For each sample firm, I create a set of bank-firm pairs from 
the Dealscan banks. For potential pool of banks, I require the banks to have lending 
activities to any US public firm reported in Dealscan after 2005. This gives 223 banks 
and creates a bank-firm panel of 335,169 (=223x1,503) pairs. For each bank-firm pair, I 
identify the lending activities from Dealscan and classify loans originated in 2006-2008 
as pre-TARP lending, while loans originated in 2009-2011 as post-TARP lending. I scale 
the change in lending by the ex-ante total asset of the sample firm. The key independent 
variable is TARP bank dummy which equals to one if the bank is a TARP bank, and zero 
otherwise. I also further interact the dummy with ex-ante bank characteristics with the 
goal to further disentangle the channel of effects. I follow the equation (3) in the 
regression.   
∆𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑘,(𝑡,𝑡−1)
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑘 + 𝛼2 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑘
∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑘 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖   
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                   (3) 
In particular, a big concern in testing the supply of credit is the failure to disentangle 
the demand side effect with the supply side effect. In other words, the difference in 
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changes in access to credit may simply reflect the change and difference in credit demand 
between TARP firms and non-TARP firms. I follow Khwaja and Mian (2008) and 
Giannetti and Simonov (2012) which design the tests to resolve the issue as well as to 
control the firms’ unobserved heterogeneity and to avoid the selection problems. Also, 
past lending relationship between firm i and bank k is controlled in the regression.  
The results on supply of credit are shown in Table 5. In column 1 panel A, I first show 
a significant reduction in supply of credit of TARP banks in the post-bailout period 
(2009-2011). This translates to an approximate 23% (=0.003/0.013) reduction in supply 
of credit from TARP bank. Next, I incorporate several bank characteristic variables as 
well as their interaction terms with TARP bank dummy into the model. According to the 
hypothesis, more financially healthy banks should experience less reduction in supply of 
credit. Financial health could be captured through ex-ante tier one capital ratio and net 
interest profit margin. The results in Table 5 are consistent with the conjecture that I find 
higher ex-ante tier one capital ratio and net interest profit margin of TARP bank is 
associated with smaller reduction in supply of credit from TARP banks.  
Moreover, consistent with findings in announcement effect, the larger the bank in size, 
the larger reduction in supply of credit from TARP banks in the post-TARP period. 
TARP banks with more cash holding prior to the crisis, the less reduction of credit supply 
after TARP injection. I further incorporate the incremental changes in banks’ cash 
holding and tier 1 capital ratios into the regressions. Interaction terms between these two 
variables and TARP bank dummy respectively are significant and negative, indicating 
that larger increases in post-injection cash or tier 1 capital, the larger reduction in supply 
of credit from those TARP participated banks. The results are consistent with findings in 
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announcement effect, suggesting that aided banks withhold the cash in post injection 
period is closely linked to the significant reduction in their credit supply to client firms. 
Lastly, I also show that given the presence of financial crisis, past lending relationship 
would still play a role in helping firm to acquire bank credits.  
Findings in Table 5 confirm earlier findings on announcement effect, suggesting that 
supply of credit is a key channel to lead to valuation losses of TARP firms. In specific, 
the results show that the worse financial condition of the TARP bank, e.g. low tier 1 
capital ratio, low net interest margin, and lower cash/asset, the larger reduction in credit 
supply to borrower firms, which could be the driver of valuation loss of TARP firms at 
TARP approval announcement of their main banks.  
Furthermore, a simple difference-in-difference (DID) regression is adopted to test the 




= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖
+ 𝛼2 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                               (4𝑎) 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖
+ 𝛼2 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                            (4𝑏) 
 
, where the dependent variables are the total amount of bank debt of firm i at year t scaled 
by firm’s total asset and total debt respectively. 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖 
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equals to one if firm i has any TARP banks as their main bank prior to October 2008, and 
zero otherwise. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡  equals to one if the fiscal year of the firm 
financial observation is from 2009 to 2011, and zero if fiscal year is between 2006 to 
2008. Firm size, market-to-book, interest coverage, and ROA are controlled in the 
regressions as well.  
Table 6 shows that exposure to TARP bank is associated with a significant reduction 
in the proportion of bank debt as of the firm capital structure. Particularly, the interaction 
term between 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦  and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 is negative 
among the two model specification and is significant in model (2), suggesting that the 
degree of reliance on bank credit for TARP firms is significantly dropped which could be 
primarily due to TARP banks’ cutting off supply of credit as shown in Table 5.  
Taken together, results in Table 5 and 6 support the conjecture that TARP 
participation reflects adversely of a bank’s financial health. In particular, I point out that 
the supply of credit serves as a key channel to explain the transmission of negative 
information of banks to client firms. As TARP banks subsequently reduce their credit 
supply, TARP firms are forced to rely more on other sources of financing which is more 
expensive comparing to bank credit. As a result, these firms will suffer from credit drain 
in spite of the government capital injection, because TARP banks will reserve the bailout 
money to solve their own financial problems rather than lending out. In turn, this could 






5.3 Financial Flexibility 
 
The next question examined in the paper is whether TARP firms become more 
financially constrained after government capital injection into their main banks. Two 
things are tested in the paper: cash flow sensitivity of cash and firm investment. Almeida 
et al (2004) articulate that financial constraint firms are more likely to save cash out of 
cash flow. The cash flow sensitivity of cash can be free from the Kaplan-Zingales 
criticism and better capture the financial constraint because the explanatory power of 
cash flow over cash policy is less likely to link to future investment demand. Following 
their argument, I investigate whether these TARP firms became more financially 
constrained after their main banks' participation in TARP with cash flow sensitivity of 
cash measure. I follow equation (5) to examine the effect. 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑖
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 +  𝛼3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃 𝑖𝑖
∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼4 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖 + 𝛿𝐼
+ 𝜃𝑌 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                             (5) 
 
In panel A of Table 7, I first incorporate three measures of firm’s exposure to TARP to 
examine the effect of TARP on firm’s cash flow sensitivity in the full sample analyses 
under a difference-in-difference setting. The triple interaction term between exposure to 
TARP measure, cash flow and post-TARP dummy is the variable of interest. Positive and 
significant coefficients for this variable are found across different specifications, 
34 
 
suggesting that TARP firms become more financially constrained in the post-TARP 
period. This result reinforces previous evidences that banks reduce the credit supply after 
participating in TARP, resulting in client firms suffering from financial constraint 
afterwards.  
Alternatively, I divide the sample into two groups, namely TARP firm and non-TARP 




= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡
+ 𝛾𝐹𝑖 + 𝛿𝐼 + 𝜃𝑌 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                (6) 
, where 𝛼1 captures the effect of financial constraint on cash flow sensitivity on cash. In 
addition, the hypothesis predicts that α2 >0, that is TARP firms became more financially 
constrained after relationship banks' participation in TARP. Other firm characteristics, 
such as market-to-book, leverage, and size are controlled in the regressions. Industry and 
year fixed effects are added in to take account of potential omitted variable problems.  
The results of regression estimates followed equation (6) are reported in panel B of 
Table 7. I first estimate the change in cash flow sensitivity of cash after 2008 for TARP 
firms and non-TARP firms respectively. I find only TARP firms experience significantly 
increases in cash flow sensitivity of cash in the post-TARP period, suggesting that the 
TARP firms become more financially constrained after their main bank's participation in 
TARP. The relative level of sensitivity increase in the post-TARP period is about 15% 
(calculated as 0.128*9.83%/8.68%). Similar results with propensity score matched 
subsample are reported in panel C. 
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Next, I examine the investment of TARP firms. The empirical specification is based 
on the q-theory, that investment is a function of marginal Q ratio which can be proxied by 
market-to-book. I augment the model with firm specific financial variables such as 
internal cash flow (Fazzari et al (1988)), value of investment in previous year, year and 
firm fixed effects to account for unobservable time and firm heterogeneity. Firm 
investment is measured with capital expenditure and the regression details are specified 
in equation (7): 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1




+ 𝛼3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖 + 𝛿𝐼 + 𝜃𝑌
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                              (7) 
, where i refers to firm i and t refers to fiscal year t. Three measures of firm’s exposure to 
TARP are adopted in the estimations. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 equals to one if the fiscal 
year of the firm financial observation is from 2009 to 2011, and zero if fiscal year is 
between 2006 to 2008.  
Variables of firm characteristics are motivated by existing literature. For example, 
cash flow is motivated by the large literature showing an association of cash flow with 
investment, which is usually interpreted as evidence of financial constraints having an 
impact on firm investment. Firms with high leverage are also likely to be more 
financially constrained or distressed. Firm size is posited to be inversely related to 
financial constraint, while ROA is deemed as an alternative proxy for future growth 
opportunities, although a high ROA could also mean that the firm has more cash at its 
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disposal and therefore less financially constrained. Under both interpretations of ROA, 
one should expect a positive impact on investment.  
Table 8 provides the results on firm investment. In column 1, the estimated coefficient 
on the interacted term 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 is negative and 
significant at the 5% level across three specifications, suggesting that TARP firm actually 
reduce their capital investment after their main banks participating in TARP. The 
coefficient -0.73% translates to a reduction of 10% (=0.0073/0.07) in capital investment 
in response. I argue that the results support the conjecture that TARP firms reduce 
investment activities after their main banks participating in TARP as they become more 
financially constrained. 
In addition, the coefficients on market-to-book are positive but insignificant. However, 
the coefficient on sales growth is positive and significant. One of the possible explanation 
is sales growth can better capture the growth opportunity during crisis while the measure 
of market-to-book can be biased due to the highly volatile stock market (Goyal and 
Yamada, 2004). The positive and significant coefficient on cash flow reflects that firms 
are sensitive to cash flow fluctuations, suggesting that financial frictions do play a role in 
deterring firm investment.  
Furthermore, I re-examine above results by stratifying firms based on various 
measures of financial constraints and distress risk and the results are showing in Table 9. 
The following measures are adopted: a measure of the firm’s financial constraints, 
computed based on White and Wu (2006), size, leverage, and Altman’s Z-score based on 
a firm’s ranking in a given year. Small firm, high leverage, low Z-score and high WW 
suggest a firm is more financially constrained. Note that both the Altman’s Z-score 
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measure and leverage could proxy for financial constraints as well as financial distress. 
Sub-sample specifications are adopted instead of a single regression with interaction 
effects, for three reasons: (1) with a total of 7 variables of interests in the regression, it 
raise concerns of multicollinearity and difficulties in interpretation of the marginal effects; 
(2) due to industry and year fixed effects, marginal effects are hard to compute even in 
the absence of multicollinearity; (3) sub-sample regressions allow variations in 
estimations of other control variables in different sub-samples.  
In panel A, I first present the results with the binary measure of firm’s exposure to 
TARP. To highlight the variable of interest – the interaction term between exposure to 
TARP and post-TARP dummy, I only report the estimates of this variable in the table.  In 
general, the results are consistent with the conjecture that more financially constrained 
firm response more to TARP exposure by reducing their investment. In all cases, the 
marginal effects of TARP exposure are larger for constrained firms than unconstrained 
firms. For example, for firms with a lower Z-score, the net effect of TARP leads to a 10% 
reduction in investment. Likewise, the marginal effect of TARP for firms with higher 
Whited and Wu (2006) is about -15%. I argue that the difference is economically 
significant. In panel B and C, I use the other two TARP exposure measures to re-examine 
the effects and similar results are found as panel A.  
Overall, results in Table 8 and 9 suggest that firms significantly reduce their capital 
investment after their main banks’ participation in TARP. Together with previous 
findings on cash flow sensitivity, it suggests that TARP firms suffer from financial 
constraint regardless of the capital injection to their main bank. Moreover, combining 
with earlier results on supply credit, I argue that firms’ financial constraint is largely 
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driven by the TARP banks’ reduction in credit supply. All of these subsequent real 
effects experienced by TARP firms explain the observed valuation losses and provide 
further evidence of the existence and transmission of negative information about TARP 




Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I systemically investigate the effect of TARP on its participated banks’ 
client firms and find that firms which strongly rely on TARP banks for credits suffer 
significant valuation losses around the date when their main banks receive approval to 
TARP. In addition, the magnitude in valuation reduction is negatively associated with 
TARP banks’ ex-ante financial condition. The findings support the proposed hypothesis 
in this paper, which states that TARP firms suffer from the negative impact arising from 
the adverse signalling associated with their main banks’ participation in TARP. However, 
while the benefit of participating in TARP enable aided banks to effectively internalize 
the adverse effect, TARP firms can’t directly enjoy such benefit, resulting in significant 
valuation losses at client firms’ level.  
In addition, empirical evidences show that TARP banks do reduce supply of credit in 
post-TARP period and those with poorer ex-ante financial conditions experience larger 
reduction in credit supply. These results suggest a potential channel which could drive the 
valuation loss of TARP firms and further confirm the hypothesis. Lastly, I examine 
whether TARP firms become more financially constrained in post-TARP period. 
Findings in this paper do suggest that TARP firms become more financially constrained 
afterwards, which is suggested by significant increases in cash flow sensitivity of cash in 
post-TARP period. In addition, in response to decreases in credit supply, I find that firms 
choose to cut their capital expenditures, especially for those small and financially 
constrained firms.  
Overall, empirical evidences found in this paper suggest that TARP fails to achieve its 
broader statutory goal that is to ease credit crunch and stimulate investment in the 
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economy, even though many anecdotal evidences do suggest that TARP has largely 
strengthened the financial sector. More importantly, this paper points out a potential 
source of welfare loss associated with government rescue program which have not been 
well documented and discussed in the literature. In fact, many future researches could be 
explored in the area built on the findings uncovered in this paper in order to arrive at a 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Constructions 
Variables Definitions 
Main bank Among all the relationship banks of a specific firm, the bank or banks 
that has the highest banking relationship with the firm.  
TARP firms Public firms have TARP banks as their main bank. 
Non-TARP firms Public firms that are not classified as TARP firms but fulfil sample 
requirements 
  
Panel A: Measures of Connections 
Exposure to TARP (Dummy) Equals to 1 if there is loan from TARP bank k to TARP firm i in the past 
5 years prior to the bank k’s TARP approval, and zero otherwise.  
Exposure to TARP (Amount) Percentage of total amount of loans from TARP bank k to TARP firm i 
as of total amount of loans of firm i in the past 5 years prior to bank k’s 
TARP approval.  
Exposure to TARP (Number) Percentage of total number of loans from TARP bank k to TARP firm i 
as of total number of loans of firm i in the past 5 years prior to bank k’s 
TARP approval. 
Exposure to TARP approval 
(dummy, amount, number) 
Aggregate firm’s exposure to TARP on a certain date, if the related 
TARP banks receive approval to the program on that date.  
Round 1 dummy Equals to 1 if TARP announcement is on Oct. 14, 2008, and zero 
otherwise. 
Round 2 dummy Equals to 1 if TARP announcement is between Oct. 21, 2008 and Nov. 
14, 2008, and zero otherwise. 
Round 3 dummy Equals to 1 if TARP announcement doesn’t belong to either round 1 or 
round 2, and zero otherwise. 
Post -TARP dummy Equals to 1 if fiscal year is later than 2008, and zero otherwise. 
  
Panel B: Measures of Financial Characteristics 
Firm size Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Calculated from 
Compustat data as ln(at). 
Market value of equity  End of fiscal year closing stock price (prcc_f) multiplied by total shares 
outstanding (csho). 
Market-to-book Calculated from Compustat data as (at-ceq-txdb+prcc_f*csho)/at. 
Cash/assets Calculated from Compustat data (ch/at) 
Market leverage  Book value of debts over market value of total assets. Calculated from 
Compustat data as (dltt+dlc)/(dltt+dlc+prcc_f*csho). 
Book leverage Book value of debts over book value of total assets. Calculated from 
Compustat data as(dltt+dlc)/at 
Interest coverage EBIT over interest expense. Calculated from Compustat data as 
(ebit/xint) 
ROA Operating income before depreciation, scaled by book value of total 
assets. Calculated from Compustat data as (ebitda/at) 
EBIT/assets EBIT over total asset. Calculated from Compustat data as (ebit/xint) 
Working capital ratio Current asset/current liabilities. Calculated from Compustat data as 
(act/lct). 
Sales growth Percentage change in sales over the prior fiscal year. 
R&D/assets R&D value over total asset. Calculated from Compustat data as (xrd/at). 
Missing R&D value is considered to equal zero. 
Capital expenditure/assets Calculated from Compustat data as (capex/at). 
Cost of goods sold/assets Calculated from Compustat data as (cogs/at). 
Cash flow Operating cash flow divided by total asset in year t-1 (oancf/l.at) 
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Industry classification Fama-French 48 industry classification. 
  
Panel C: Measures of Bank Characteristics 
Bank size Calculated from Bankscope data as ln(data2025) 
Tier 1 capital ratio Obtained from Bankscope data (data2130), which is calculated as tier 1 
capital over risk weighted asset value 
Non-performing loan ratio Calculated from Bankscope data as (data5240/data2001) 
Net interest profit margin Calculated from Bankscope data as (data2080/data2010) 
ROA Calculated from Bankscope data as (data2115/data2025) 
Net charge-offs Calculated from Bankscope data as (data2150/data5240) 
Loan loss provision Calculated from Bankscope data as (data2095/data5240) 




Table 1 Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of 1,503 firms in the sample. Financial characteristics of year 2007 
are reported. All the firms are required to have non-missing total asset and market-to-book ratio. Financial 
and utility firms are deleted in the sample. Detailed definitions of variables are shown in the appendix.  
 
Variable  Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Number of observations 1,503 
    
Total asset 6,104 1,162 27,069 
Market value of equity 7,001 1,135 25,411 
Market-to-book 1.820 1.511 1.070 
Cash/asset 8.68% 5.04% 0.01 
Operating cash flow/asset 9.83% 9.57% 0.08 
Market leverage 0.22 0.18 0.20 
Book leverage 0.26 0.23 0.23 
Working capital ratio 2.05 1.75 1.50 
Interest coverage 49.34 5.59 473.60 
R&D/asset 0.02 0.00 0.08 
Capex/asset 0.07 0.039 0.08 
ROA 0.13 0.13 0.15 
COGS/asset 0.815 0.641 0.72 
Sale growth 1.19 1.09 1.35 
Z- score 4.19 3.51 4.14 
WW -0.32 -0.32 0.08 
Bank debt/asset 13.50% 7.68% 0.17 





Table 2 Stock Price Reactions to TARP 
Abnormal returns of sample firms around TARP approval announcement date are reported in this table. 
Summary statistics of treatment and control groups are reported respectively. Treatment group include 
firms which have at least one of their main banks received approval announcement to TARP on a certain 
date, whereas control group include firms which have none of their main bank received approval 
announcement to TARP on the same date. I require sample firms to be non-financial and non-utility firms. 
3-day, 7-day and 11-day event windows are implemented in measuring cumulative abnormal return. I use a 
260-day estimation window, i.e.  [Day -290, Day -31] and require firms to have non-missing returns on all 
days during the period from day -5 to day +5. Mean CAR and t-statistics are reported. Different models in 
calculating CARs are adopted. Panel A shows the results calculated from market model, while Panel B 
shows the result of CAR with Fama-French Three-Factor Model. Panel C shows the results of CARs with 
Fama-French-Carhart Four-Factor Model. Significance of difference between different sample groups are 




  Treatment group Control group 
Difference 
(treatment-control) 
  Mean CAR t-stat Mean CAR t-stat t-stat 
Number of Observations 1,038 19,008 
 
      
Panel A: Market Model Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
(-1, +1) -3.38% -10.47 -0.86% -11.77 -7.88*** 
(-3, +3) -2.05% -4.41 -0.51% -4.67 -3.25*** 
(-5, +5) -2.59% -4.67 0.04% 0.28 -4.30*** 
Panel B: Fama-French Three-Factor Model Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
(-1, +1) -0.76% -2.33 -0.13% -1.81 -1.97** 
(-3, +3) -1.73% -3.84 0.03% 0.31 -3.74*** 
(-5, +5) -1.39% -2.66 0.69% 5.28 -3.51*** 
Panel C: Fama-French Four-Factor Model Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
(-1, +1) -0.78% -2.41 -0.11% -1.63 -2.49** 
(-3, +3) -1.76% -3.88 -0.03% -0.31 -3.76*** 






Table 3 TARP Announcement Effect 
This table provides the results of multivariate analyses of announcement effects. In the OLS regressions, 
the dependent variable is CAR (-1day, +1day) around banks’ TARP approval announcement date 
calculated from adjusted market model with a 260-day estimation window, i.e.  [Day -290, Day -31]. Firms 
are required to have non-missing returns on all days during the period from day -5 to day +5. Main 
independent variables include exposure to TARP approval, and its interaction terms with TARP round 
dummy. Three measures of exposure to TARP approval are constructed based on the past 5-year lending 
relationship with banks received TARP approval on a certain date. Other firm financial characteristics are 
controlled in the regression. Panel A shows the full sample regressions, whereas Panel B provides results 
with subsample created by propensity score matching. Details of variable definitions are stated in the 
appendix. Robust standard errors are corrected for within-firm and within-announcement date clustering 
respectively. Industry fixed effects are controlled. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% 





Panel A Full sample 
 
CAR(-1,+1) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Exposure to TARP approval (Dummy) -0.025*** -0.025*** 
   
 
(0.004) (0.003) 




   
(0.004) 
  Exposure to TARP approval (Number) 
   
-0.032*** 
 
    
(0.004) 
 Exposure to TARP approval (Dummy)× Round 1 dummy 
    
-0.026*** 
     
(0.004) 
Exposure to TARP approval (Dummy)× Round 2 dummy 
    
-0.030*** 
     
(0.005) 
Exposure to TARP approval (Dummy)× Round 3 dummy 
    
-0.031* 




0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash/Asset 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Leverage 
 
-0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Interest coverage 
 
0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market-to-book 
 
-0.046 -0.046 -0.046 -0.044 
  
(0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.146) 
ROA 
 
0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
      Observations 20,042 17,654 17,654 17,654 17,654 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2-way cluster at firm and announcement date Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Panel B Propensity score matching  
 
CAR(-1,+1) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Exposure to TARP approval (Dummy) -0.016** -0.017*** 
   
 
(0.007) (0.006) 




   
(0.005) 
  Exposure to TARP approval (Number) 
   
-0.021*** 
 
    
(0.005) 
 Exposure to TARP approval (Dummy)× Round 1 dummy 
    
-0.020*** 
     
(0.005) 
Exposure to TARP approval (Dummy)× Round 2 dummy 
    
-0.024*** 
     
(0.008) 
Exposure to TARP approval (Dummy)× Round 3 dummy 
    
-0.030 
     
(0.019) 
      Other controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,167 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2-way cluster at firm and announcement date Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-square 0.073 0.081 0.083 0.083 0.085 
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Table 4 Bank Characteristics and Announcement Effect 
This table provides results of how ex-ante bank characteristics explain announcement effects of TARP approval. Dependent variable is CAR (-1day, +1day) 
around banks’ approval announcement date calculated from adjusted market model with a 260-day estimation window, i.e.  [Day -290, Day -31]. I require firms 
to have non-missing returns on all days during the period from day -5 to day +5. The sample only contains all the firms with exposure to certain TARP approvals, 
measured based on the past 5-year lending relationship with TARP banks. Bank’s ex-ante characteristics as reported in fiscal year 2007 from Bankscope. 
Dummy variables instead of continuous measures of these variables are adopted. Large bank dummy equals to 1 if bank is higher or equal to sector median, and 
zero otherwise. Similar, higher NPL ratio dummy, high cash ratio dummy, high tier 1 capital ratio dummy, and high ROA dummy are defined as 1 if the value of 
the variable is above sector median, and zero otherwise. In addition, changes of bank cash over total asset ratio and tier 1 capital ratio after TARP injection are 
examined. Firm characteristics, including total asset, cash/asset, leverage, market-to-book, ROA and interest coverage are controlled in all regressions. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at bank and announcement date level respectively. Industry fixed effects are controlled. ***, ** and * indicate statistically 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
 
 CAR(-1, +1) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Large bank dummy -0.117*** 
      
 
(0.011) 
      High NPL ratio dummy 
 
-0.051*** 
     
  
(0.017) 
     High cash ratio dummy 
  
0.021** 
    
   
(0.008) 
    High tier 1 capital ratio dummy 
   
0.020*** 
   
    
(0.006) 
   High ROA dummy 
    
0.001 
  
     
(0.027) 
  Δ Bank cash/asset 
    
 -0.002  
     
 (0.038)  
Δ Tier 1 capital ratio 
    
  -0.706** 
     
  (0.264) 
     
 
  Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 868 868 868 868 868 770 762 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2-way clustered at bank and announcement dat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 5 Supply of Credit 
Table 5 reports the effect of TARP inception on bank’s supply of credit to firms. The sample period in this 
table is from 2006 to 2011. Dependent variables reflect the change of total 3-year lending amount from 
bank k to firm i before and after the TARP injection. I follow Khwaja and Mian(2008), and Giannetti and 
Simonov(2012) to control for demand side effect with firm fixed effects. Dependent variables is the 
difference in loan amount of firm i from bank k before and after TARP injection. TARP bank dummy 
equals to 1 if the bank is a TARP recipient bank, and zero otherwise. Key independent variable includes 
bank characteristics such as bank size, bank cash/asset, tier 1 capital ratio, net interest margin, changes in 
cash/asset and tier 1 capital ratio after TARP injection, and their interaction terms with TARP bank dummy. 
In addition, past lending relationship between firm i and the bank k in the last 5 years is also controlled. 
Coefficients for bank size and its interaction term are multiplied by 1000. Firm fixed effect is controlled 
and robust standard errors standard errors are corrected for within-firm clustering. Details of variable 
definitions are stated in the appendix. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 




Δ Loanik(t,t-1) / Assett-1 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TARP bank dummy -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 0.015*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
-0.001 
     
  
(0.001) 
     TARP bank dummy x Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
0.035*** 
     
  
(0.004) 
     Net interest profit margin 
  
0.005** 
    
   
(0.003) 
    TARP bank dummy x Net interest profit margin 
  
0.075*** 
    
   
(0.028) 
    Bank size 
   
-0.137** 
   
    
(0.058) 
   TARP bank dummy x Bank size 
   
-1.777*** 
   
    
(0.165) 
   Bank cash/asset 
    
-0.002 
  
     
(0.005) 
  TARP bank dummy x Bank cash/asset 
    
0.018*** 
  
     
(0.004) 
  Δ Bank cash/asset 
     
-0.001  
      
(0.001)  
TARP bank dummy x Δ Bank cash/asset 
     
-0.031***  
      
(0.007)  
Δ Tier 1 capital ratio 
     
 -0.000 
      
 (0.000) 
TARP bank dummy x Δ Tier 1 capital ratio 
     
 -0.050*** 
      
 (0.015) 
Past lending Relationship 0.225*** 0.212*** 0.224*** 0.232*** 0.205*** 0.227*** 0.212*** 
 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) 
      
  
Observations 335,169 124,749 141,282 145,791 144,288 138,276 120,240 
Firm fix effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered at firm level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 6 Financing Structure 
This Table reports the impact of bank’s participation in TARP on their client firms’ financing structure. 
Sample period is from 2006 to 2011. Four measures of bank debt exposure are used as dependent variables 
in the analyses. For independent variable, exposure to TARP dummy equals to one if any TARP recipient 
bank is the main bank of the firm, and zero otherwise. Post-TARP dummy equals to one if fiscal year is 
after 2009, (including 2009), and zero otherwise. Interaction term of above two dummies is included in the 
regression. Estimates of coefficient for interest coverage are multiplied by 100. Industry and year fixed 
effects are controlled. Robust standard errors corrected for within-firm clustering are reported in the 
parentheses. Details of variable definitions are stated in the appendix. ***, ** and * indicate statistically 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%level respectively.  
 
VARIABLES Total bank debt/Asset 
Total bank debt 
/Total debt 
Exposure to TARP (Dummy) -0.030*** -0.041* 
 
(0.010) (0.022) 
Exposure to TARP (Dummy) x Post-TARP dummy -0.007 -0.040** 
 
(0.007) (0.020) 
Size -0.024*** -0.117*** 
 
(0.002) (0.005) 
Market-to-book -0.003 -0.011 
 
(0.006) (0.013) 
Interest coverage -0.033*** 0.042*** 
 
(0.003) (0.015) 
ROA 0.065 0.179* 
 
(0.046) (0.100) 
   Observations 5,521 5,380 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clustered at firm level Yes Yes 

















Table 7 Cash Flow Sensitivity 
Table 7 provides results of effect of TARP injection on client firms’ cash flow sensitivity of cash. The 
sample period in this table is from 2006 to 2011. The dependent variable is the changes in cash holding for 
firm i at year t, scaled by total asset in year t-1. Post-TARP dummy equals to one if fiscal year is after 2009, 
(including 2009), and zero otherwise. In panel A, I regress the change of cash scale by pre-TARP total asset 
level on measures of exposure to TARP and their interactions with post-TARP dummy and cash flow post 
TARP injection. In panel B, I divide the sample firms into two groups, TARP firms and control firms. 
TARP firms refer to firms which has any of their main bank (the number 1 relationship bank) participated 
in TARP, whereas control firms are the rest of firms in the sample. Panel C provides results on propensity 
score matched subsample. Other controls include market-to-book, sales growth, cash flow, size, leverage, 
cash flow × post-TARP dummy, and measures of relationship with TARP bank. Details of variable 
definitions are stated in the appendix and robust standard errors are corrected for within-firm clustering. 
Industry and year fixed effects are controlled in the regressions.  ***, ** and * indicate statistically 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
 
Panel A Full sample (specification 1) 
 Δ Cashi(t,t-1) / Assett-1 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Exposure to TARP (Dummy) 0.002   
 (0.006)   
Exposure to TARP (Dummy) × Post-TARP dummy -0.007   
 (0.008)   
Exposure to TARP (Dummy) × Cash flow -0.098*   
 (0.054)   
Exposure to TARP (Dummy) × Cash flow ×Post-TARP dummy 0.139**   
 (0.069)   
Exposure to TARP (Amount)  -0.006  
  (0.007)  
Exposure to TARP (Amount) × Post-TARP dummy  -0.004  
  (0.009)  
Exposure to TARP (Amount) × Cash flow  -0.042  
  (0.062)  
Exposure to TARP (Amount) × Cash flow ×Post-TARP dummy  0.140*  
  (0.080)  
Exposure to TARP (Number)   -0.008 
   (0.007) 
Exposure to TARP (Number) × Post-TARP dummy   -0.001 
   (0.009) 
Exposure to TARP (Number) × Cash flow   -0.021 
   (0.062) 
Exposure to TARP (Number) × Cash flow ×Post-TARP dummy   0.104 
   (0.081) 
    
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,221 6,221 6,221 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered at firm level Yes Yes Yes 





Panel B Full sample (specification 2) 
 Δ Cashi(t,t-1) / Assett-1 
VARIABLES TARP firms Control firms 
Cash flow ×Post-TARP dummy 0.128*** -0.021 
 (0.040) (0.058) 
Cash flow 0.296*** 0.378*** 
 (0.032) (0.050) 
Sales Growth 0.006 0.019* 
 (0.006) (0.011) 
Market-to-book -0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Size 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.008 -0.010 
 (0.006) (0.009) 
   
Observations 4,397 1,816 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clustered at firm level Yes Yes 
Adj. R-square 0.134 0.119 
 
 
Panel C Propensity score matched subsample 
 Δ Cashi(t,t-1) / Assett-1 
VARIABLES TARP firms Control firms 
Cash flow ×Post-TARP dummy 0.125*** -0.002 
 (0.042) (0.063) 
   
Other controls Yes Yes 
Observations 3,692 1,395 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clustered at firm level Yes Yes 





Table 8 Firm Investment  
Table below provides results of firm investment. The sample period in this table is from 2006 to 2011. 
Dependent variable is capital expenditure by sample firms scaled by total asset. Independent variables 
include measures of firm’s exposure to TARP recipient banks, post-TARP dummy, and their interaction 
terms. Panel A provides the results of the full sample, whereas panel B provides the results of propensity 
score matched subsample. Other controls include lag of investment, market-to-book, sales growth, and cash 
flow. Year and industry fixed effects are controlled. Details of variable definitions are stated in the 
appendix. Robust standard errors are corrected for within-firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
 
Panel A Full sample 
 Capexi,t / Assett 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Exposure to TARP (Dummy) 0.0048*   
 (0.003)   
Exposure to TARP (Dummy)×Post-TARP dummy -0.0073**   
 (0.003)   
Exposure to TARP (Amount)  0.0044  
  (0.003)  
Exposure to TARP (Amount)×Post-TARP dummy  -0.0072**  
  (0.003)  
Exposure to TARP (Number)   0.0043 
   (0.003) 
Exposure to TARP (Number)×Post-TARP dummy   -0.0074** 
   (0.003) 
    
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,911 13,911 13,911 
Industrial fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered at firm level Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-square 0.422 0.421 0.421 
 
 
Panel B Propensity matched subsample 
 Capexi,t / Assett 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Exposure to TARP (Dummy)×Post-TARP dummy -0.009***   
 (0.003)   
Exposure to TARP (Amount)×Post-TARP dummy  -0.008**  
  (0.004)  
Exposure to TARP (Number)×Post-TARP dummy   -0.008** 
   (0.004) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,161 4,161 4,161 
Industrial fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered at firm level Yes Yes Yes 




Table 9 Financial Constraint and Firm Investments 
This table reports the effects of TARP on relationship firms' investment. The sample period is from 2006 to 2011 and financial constraints are measured by size, leverage, 
Altman’s z-score, and Whited and Wu (2006) respectively. Other Controls include lag of investment, market-to-book, sales growth, cash flow, leverage, ROA and size. The 
estimates of coefficient of three measures of firm’s exposure to TARP and post-TARP dummy are reported. Industry and year fixed effects are controlled and robust standard 
errors are corrected for within-firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
 
 






Z-score Low WW High WW 
Panel A         
Exposure to TARP (Dummy)×Post-TARP dummy -0.010** -0.002 -0.002 -0.011** -0.008* -0.006 -0.004 -0.009** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Panel B         
Exposure to TARP (Amount)× Post-TARP dummy -0.011** -0.001 -0.001 -0.014** -0.009* -0.007 -0.003 -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
Panel C         
Exposure to TARP (Number)× Post-TARP dummy -0.011** -0.000 -0.001 -0.013** -0.009* -0.006 -0.002 -0.010** 





Figure 1 Sample Definition 
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the sample definition. Banks receive TARP 
funding are referred as TARP banks, and banks didn’t participate in TARP are defined as non-
TARP banks. Firms have any of their main banks being TARP bank, are classified as TARP 







Figure 2 Graphical Illustrations of Hypotheses 
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the hypotheses. The U.S. Treasury injected equity 
to financial institutions via TARP. At the bank level, such equity injection has two competing 
effects. The positive effect associated with TARP injection is that such government rescue 
program serves as implicit guarantee which could prevent banks from further deterioration 
and potential bankruptcy risk. In the meantime, it can also send negative signals to the market 
about the banks’ financial conditions, leading to valuation losses of the banks. Given the 
competing effects at the bank level, the adverse effect of such government injection could be 
fully concealed at the bank level. In order to disentangle the effects, the paper examines the 
effect of TARP on bank clients rather than on banks. An alternative hypothesis is proposed as 
that clients of TARP banks will suffer valuation losses as TARP banks withhold the 
government fund rather than further distribute to the economy, and yet market anticipate these 
firms to suffer from future bank financing shortage as their main banks are confirmed to be in 
poor condition. In contrast, the null hypothesis is that TARP firms benefit from such 
government capital injection as it encourages banks to resume lending.    
 
 
